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Abstract
We construct a matching model on the marriage market along more than one char-
acteristic, where individuals have preferences over physical attractiveness and socioe-
conomic characteristics that can be summarized by a one-dimensional index combining
these various attributes. We show that under a (testable) separability assumption, the
indices are ordinally identied. We estimate the model using data from the PSID. Our
separability tests do not reject. We nd that among men, a 10% increase in BMI can
be compensated by a higher wage of around 3%. Similarly, for women, an additional
year of education may compensate up to three BMI units.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of matching patterns in the population has recently attracted considerable at-
tention, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Most models focus on exactly
one characteristic on which the matching process is assumed to be exclusively based. Vari-
ous studies have thus investigated the features of assortative matching on income, wages or
education (e.g., Becker, 1991; Pencavel, 1998; Wong, 2003; Chow and Siow, 2006; Flinn and
Del Boca, 2007), but also on such preference-based notions as risk aversion (e.g., Chiappori
and Reny, 2004; Legros and Newman, 2007) or desire to have a child (Chiappori and Ore¢ ce,
2008).
One-dimensional matching models o¤er several advantages. Their formal properties are
by now well established. In a transferable utility context, they provide a simple and elegant
way to explain the type of assortative matching patterns that are currently observed; namely,
the stable match is positive (negative) assortative if and only if the surplus function is super
(sub) modular. Moreover, it is possible, from the shape of the surplus function, to recover the
equilibrium allocation of resources within each match, a feature that proves especially useful
in many theoretical approaches. Arguments of this type have been applied, for instance, to
explain why female demand for university education may outpace that of men (Chiappori,
Iyigun and Weiss, 2009), or how women unwilling to resort to abortion still beneted from
its legalization (Chiappori and Ore¢ ce, 2008).
These advantages, however, come at a cost. The transferable utility assumption generates
strong restrictions. For instance, the e¢ cient decision at the group level does not depend on
the distribution of Pareto weights within the group. This implies not only that the group
behaves as a single individual - a somewhat counterfactual statement, as illustrated by nu-
merous empirical studies - but also that a redistribution of powers, say to the wife, cannot
by assumption alter the groups aggregate behavior. Secondly, matching models with super-
modular surplus can only predict perfectly assortative matching - while reality is obviously
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much more complex, if only because of the role played by chance (or unobservable factors) in
the assignments. Thirdly, and more importantly, empirical evidence strongly suggests that,
in real life, matching processes are actually multidimensional; spouses tend to be similar in
a variety of characteristics, including age, education, race, religion, and anthropometric char-
acteristics such as weight or height (e.g., Becker, 1991; Weiss and Willis, 1997; Qian, 1998;
Silventoinen et al., 2003; Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely, 2010; Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque,
2010).
Each of these criticisms has, in turn, generated further research aimed at adressing the cor-
responding concerns. Models of frictionless matching without transferable utility have been
developed by Chiappori and Reny (2004), Legros and Newman (2007) and Browning, Chiap-
pori and Weiss (2010). Following the seminal, theoretical contribution by Shimer and Smith
(2000), several empirical contributions (Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss,
2010) introduce randomness into the matching process, to account for the deviations from
perfectly assortative matching that characterize actual data. Finally, Hitsch et al. (2010),
working on online dating, introduce several dimensions by modelling individual utility as a
linear valuation of the matesattributes within a Gale-Shapley framework (in which transfers
between mates are ruled out). However, they lack the relevant information on the matches ac-
tually formed. Still within a Gale-Shapley framework, Banerjee, Duo, Ghatak and Lafortune
(2009) consider newspaper weddings ads in India providing information on height, physical
appearance, caste and income of potential spouses to analyze the value of caste. Perhaps
more interestingly, Galichon and Salanié (2009) explicitly model multidimensional matching
in a frictionless framework under transferable utility.
The goal of the present paper is to simultaneously address the concerns described above.
We investigate the relative importance on the marriage market of anthropometric and so-
cioeconomic characteristics, and the way men and women assess these characteristics; our
approach is therefore intrinsically multi-dimensional. In addition, we assume that some of
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the relevant characteristics are not observable to the econometrician; as a consequence, the
matching process is partly random, at least from an exterior perspective, and does not result
in a perfectly assortative outcome. Finally, we do not focus on a specic setting or matching
game. Our approach is compatible with a large variety of matching mechanisms, including
frictionless models with and without transferable utility, random matching à la Shimer and
Smith, search models and others. Our empirical strategy relies on a crucial assumption -
namely, that individual attractiveness on the marriage market is fully determined by an
index that depends on the agents (observable and non observable) characteristics, and that
this index is moreover weak separable in the observable variables. We show that, under this
assumption, it is possible to non-parametrically identify the form of the relevant indices up
to some increasing transform. In particular, one can non-parametrically recover the trade-o¤
between the various observable dimensions that characterize each individual. Technically, the
index we postulate allows to dene iso-attractiveness prolesand marginal rates of substi-
tution between the di¤erent individual characteristics; we show that these proles and MRSs
are exactly identied from the matching patterns.
Our weak separability assumption, while parsimonious, is certainly restrictive. We show,
however, that it is testable, and we provide a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions that
have to be satised for the assumption to hold. In the end, whether the assumption is accept-
able becomes therefore an empirical issue. We apply our approach to marital trade-o¤s in the
United States, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which contains
anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics of married men and women from 1999 to
2007. We proxy a mans socio-economic status by his wage; for women, since participation is a
serious issue (a signicant fraction of females in our sample do not work), we use education as
our main socioeconomic variable. Regarding non-economic characteristics, the PSID provides
data on individual weight and height, which we use to construct the individual body mass
index (BMI), our main proxy for non-economic (physical) attractiveness. Our specication
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tests, which characterize the implication of the weak separability assumption, do not reject
the assumption; this result is surprisingly robust. We can therefore identify the trade-o¤s
between economic and non-economic aspects; we nd, for instance, that a 10% increase in
BMI can be compensated by a higher wage, the supplement being estimated to be around
3%. Similarly, for women, an additional year of education may compensate up to three BMI
units. Interestingly, male physical attractiveness matters as well.
Our work is related to a large economic research agenda on the e¤ects of anthropometric
measures. Many economists have been working on assessing the e¤ects of height, weight and
BMI on labor-market outcomes. The consensus is that BMI in the overweight or obese range
has negative e¤ects on the probability of employment and on hourly wages, particularly for
women (Cawley, 2000; Cawley, 2004; Han, Norton, and Stearns, 2009), while height has a
positive e¤ect on hourly wages, perhaps reecting the fact that taller people are more likely
to have reached their full cognitive potential (Case and Paxson, 2008) and/or may possess
superior physical capacities (Lundborg, Nystedt, Rooth, 2009). A related body of literature
using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data links womens weight to lower spousal
earnings or lower likelihood of being in a relationship (Averett and Korenman, 1996; Averett,
Sikora and Argys, 2008; Mukhopadhyay, 2008; Tosini, 2009). However, these data provide
anthropometric measures of the respondent only, so that the weight-income trade-o¤ across
spouses is estimated without controlling for the mens physical attributes. The same can be
said about the inuential work by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), which shows that physically
unattractive women are matched with less educated husbands. Assortative mating in body
weights has been established in the medical and psychological literatures, which document
signicant and positive interspousal correlations for weight (Schafer and Keith, 1990; Allison
et al., 1996; Speakman et al., 2007), and the importance of examining the e¤ect of both
spousescharacteristics on their marriage (Fu and Goldman, 2000; Je¤rey and Rick, 2002;
McNulty and Ne¤, 2008).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal framework on which our
approach is based. Section 3 discusses how to measure attractiveness that mates care about.
Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 shows the matching
patterns we observe in the data. Section 6 provides a formal test of our model and its empirical
results. Section 7 considers some extensions. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a population of men and a population of women. Each potential husband, say
i 2 I, is characterized by a vector Xi =
 




of observable characteristics, and by
some vector of unobservable characteristics "i 2 RS the distribution of which is centered and
independent of X. Similarly, woman j 2 J is dened by a vector of observable variables
Yj =
 




and some unobservable characteristics j 2 RS which are centered and
independent of Y .
Our key assumption is the following:
Assumption I The attractiveness of male i (resp. female j) on the marriage mar-
ket is fully summarized by a one-dimensional index Ii = F
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). Moreover, these indices are weakly separable in
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for some mappings i; j from RS+1 to R and I (resp. J) from RK (resp. RL) to R.
In practice, our assumption has the following implication. Assume that we observe the
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marital patterns in the population under consideration - i.e., the joint density d
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X1; :::; XK ; Y 1; :::; Y L

of observables among married couples. Then this density has the form:
d
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Y 1; :::; Y L

for some measure d on R2. In particular, the conditional distribution of
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Y 1; :::; Y L

only depends on the value J
 
Y 1; :::; Y L

. In other words,
the subindex I, which only depends on observables, is a su¢ cient statistic for the distribution
of characteristics of a mans spouse; and the same holds with subindex J for women. Note
that this property holds irrespective of the specic matching game that is played between
agents; we simply assume that, from a males viewpoint, two women j and j0 with di¤erent
proles
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but identical indices J
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equivalent marital prospects, so that any di¤erence between their matesrespective proles
must be purely driven by the unobservable characteristics - i.e., is seen by the econometrician
as random (and similarly for men).
An important consequence is that it is in general possible, from data on the matching
patterns, to (ordinally) identify the underlying, attractiveness indices. Indeed, the expected
value of the kth characteristic of the wife, conditional on the vector of characteristics of the
husband, is of the form:
E












for some function s. This shows that the function I is identied up to some transform (here
s). It follows that the trade-o¤ between various characteristics can easily be modeled. Since
attractiveness is fully summarized by the subindices I and J , we can dene iso-attractiveness
proles, i.e. proles of observable characteristics that generate the same (distribution of)
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to be di¤erentiable, the marginal rate of substitution between characteristics n and m can be




where the partials are taken at
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(and a similar denition can be given for women).
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
=@Xn
@E [Y s j X1i ; :::; XKi ] =@Xm
; (3)
which are exactly identied. Moreover, the left hand side of the expression above does not
depend on s, so neither should the right hand side, which generates the overidentifying re-
strictions we mentioned in the introduction. Conversely, if the right hand side ratio in (3) is
independent of s, then there exists a function I, and L functions 1; :::L, such that (2) is
satised, which shows that the condition is also su¢ cient.
3 Measuring Attractiveness
3.1 Physical Attractiveness
There exists a considerable literature on measuring physical attractiveness in which weight
scaled by height (BMI) is widely used as a proxy for socially dened physical attractiveness
(e.g., Gregory and Rhum, 2009). Indeed, Rooth (2009) found that photos that were manipu-
lated to make a person of normal weight appear to be obese caused a change in the viewers
perception, from attractive to unattractive.
Both body shape and body size are important determinants of physical attractiveness; in
practice, BMI provides information on body size, while the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) and
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the waist-to-chest ratio (WCR) provide information on body shape. The available empirical
evidence, however, indicates that BMI is a far more important factor than WHR of female
physical attractiveness (Toveé, Reinhardt, Emery and Cornelissen, 1998; Toveé et al., 1999).
The literature review on body shape, body size and physical attractiveness by Swami (2008)
seems to point to BMI being the dominant cue for female physical attractiveness, with WHR
(the ratio of the width of the waist to the width of the hips) playing a more minor role.
Regarding male physical attractiveness, WCR (waist-to-chest) plays a more important role
than either the WHR or BMI, but it must be emphasized that BMI and WCR are strongly
positively correlated. Not surprisingly, BMI is correlated with the male attractiveness rating
by women, though this correlation is lower than the one with WCR.1
Practically, although we would like to have information on BMI for women and WCR for
men, we are not aware of any study with detailed measures of body shape and socioeconomic
characteristics which simultaneously provides these data for both spouses. Since BMI has
been shown to constitute a good proxy for male physical attractiveness, we will use this
measure in our analysis.
We conclude with two remarks. First, our notion of attractiveness postulates that indi-
viduals of one gender rank the relevant characteristics of the opposite sex in the same way
- say, all men prefer thinner women. Such a vertical evaluation may not hold for other
characteristics. Age is a typical example: while a female teenager is likely to prefer a male
adolescent over a middle age man, a mature woman would probably have the opposite rank-
ing. In this regard, we follow most of the applied literature on matching in assuming that
di¤erent age classes constitute di¤erent matching populations. Since, however, preferences
on other characteristics (like BMI) may vary across these populations, we control for age in
1Wells, Treleaven and Cole (2007), using a large survey of adults in the UK (more than 4,000 men and more
than 5,000 women) and a sophisticated technique to assess body shape (three-dimensional body scanning),
investigate the relationship of shape and BMI. They nd that BMI conveys di¤erent information about men
and women: the two main factors associated with weight in men after adjustment for height are chest and
waist, whereas in women they are hip and bust. They suggested that chest in men but hips in women reect
physique (the form or structure of a persons body, i.e., physical appearance), whereas waist in men and bust
in women reects fatness.
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all our regressions. Secondly, another possible indicator of physical attractiveness, the valid-
ity of which has been extensively discussed in the literature (see Herpin (2005) for detailed
references), is height. Again, whether the height criterion is valued in a unanimous way (all
men prefer taller women) or in an individual-specic one (say, tall men prefer tall women,
but short males prefers petites) is not clear and it seems to be a measure of male, rather than
female, physical attractiveness. The question, however, can be given an empirical answer that
relies on the previous discussion; we consider this issue in section 7.2
3.2 Socioeconomic Attractiveness
In our model, men and women observe potential matesability in the labor market and in
the household, such as ability to generate income, disutility from work, earnings capacity and
household productivity. Since most of these are not directly observed by the econometrician,
we need to dene an acceptable proxy for both genders. The most natural indicator of
socioeconomic attractiveness is probably wage; not only does wage directly measure a persons
ability to generate income from a given amount of input (labor supply), but it is also strongly
correlated with other indicators of socioeconomic attractiveness, such as prestige or social
status. The main problem with wage, however, is that it is only observed for people who
actually work. This is a relatively minor problem for men, since their participation rate, at
least in the age category we shall consider, is close to one; but it may be a serious problem
for women. One solution could be to estimate a potential wage for non-working women; the
drawback of this strategy being to introduce an additional layer of measurement error in
some of the key variables. In practice, however, potential wages are predicted from a small
number of variables: age, education, number of children and various interactions of these (plus
typically time and geographical dummy variables). Here, we are interested in the matching
patterns at rst marriage; we therefore consider a female population that is both relatively
2Notice also that our analysis refers to the Western culture, as in some developing countries the relationship
between female attractiveness and BMI may be di¤erent.
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homogeneous in age and typically without children. We may therefore assume that education
is an acceptable proxy for female socioeconomic attractiveness. Additionally, female education
may also capture ability to produce quality household goods, which is likely to be valued by
men.
We can now proceed to the empirical analysis of matching patterns along these two di-
mensions - i.e., physical and socioeconomic attractiveness.
4 Data description
Our empirical work uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID
is a longitudinal household survey collecting a wide range of individual and household demo-
graphic, income, and labor-market variables. In addition, in all the most recent waves since
1999 (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007), the PSID provides the weights (in pounds) and
heights (in feet and inches) of both household heads and wives, which we use to calculate
the BMI of each spouse, dened as an individuals body weight (in kilograms) divided by
the square of his or her height (in meters squared)3. Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2010)
has shown that non-response to body size questions appears to be very small in the PSID
data. Specically, item non-response for husbands height is below 1.4% in each year, for
wifes height is below 1.4% in each year, and for husbands weight is below 2.2% in each year.
Regarding wifes weight, item non-response is below 5.5% in each year.
In each of the survey years under consideration, the PSID comprises about 4,500 married
households. We select households with a household head and a wife where both are actually
present. In our sample years, all the married heads with spouse present are males, so we
refer to each couple as husband and wife, respectively. We conne our study to those couples
whose wife is between 20 and 50 years old, given that the median age at rst marriage of
3The pounds/inches BMI formula is: Weight (in pounds) x 704.5 divided by Height (in inches) x Height
(in inches).
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women in the US was 25.1 in 2000 and 26.2 in 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, 2005; American Community Survey, 2008). The upper bound 50 is chosen to focus on
prime-age couples. Our main analysis comprises white spouses, with the husband working in
the labor market, so that we include couples with both working and non-working wives. We
focus on white couples because in the PSID blacks are disproportionately over-represented in
low-income households (poverty/SEO sample). Following Conley and Glauber (2007), we
discard those couples whose height and weight values include any extreme ones: a weight of
more than 400 or less than 70 pounds, a height above 84 or below 45 inches. In our main analy-
sis we focus on individuals who are in the normal- and over- weight range (18.5BMI<30).
We consider obese individuals in section 7.
Because the PSID main les do not contain any direct question concerning the duration
of the marriages, we rely on the Marital History File: 1985-2007Supplement of the PSID
to obtain the year of marriage and number of marriages, to account for the duration of the
couplescurrent marriage. We merge this information to our main sample using the unique
household and person identiers provided by the PSID. We establish a threshold of less than
or equal to three years of marriage, as a proxy for how recently a couple formed. This
demographic group is worth analyzing because the marriage market penalties for BMI should
arise through sorting at the time of the match.
In the PSID all the variables, including the information on the wife, are reported by the
head of the household. Reed and Price (1998) found that family proxy-respondents tend
to overestimate heights and underestimate weights of their family members, so that family
proxy-respondent estimates follow the same patterns as self-reported estimates (see Gorber et
al., 2007, for a review). The authors suggest that the best proxy-respondents are those who
are in frequent contact with the target. Since we are considering married couples, the best
proxy-respondents are likely to be the spouses. Additionally, although it is well-known that
self-reported anthropometric measures are likely to su¤er from measurement error, Thomas
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and Frankenberg (2002) and Ezzati et al. (2006) showed that in the United States, self-
reported heights exaggerate actual heights, on average, and that the di¤erence is close to
constant for ages 20-50. Finally, Cawley (2000, 2004) used the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey III (NHANES III) to estimate the relationship between measured height
and weight and their self-reported counterparts. First, he estimated regressions of the corre-
sponding measured variable to its self-reported counterpart by age and race. Then, assuming
transportability, he used the NHANES III estimated coe¢ cients to adjust the self-reported
variables from the NLSY. The results for the e¤ect of BMI on wages were very similar, whether
corrected for measurement error or not. Hence, we rely on his ndings, and we are condent
that our results (based on unadjusted data) are unlikely to be signicantly biased.
The additional characteristics we use in our empirical analysis are age, log hourly wage,
and education. Education is dened as the number of completed years of schooling and is
top-coded at 17 for some completed graduate work. We establish a minimum threshold of
9 years of schooling. State dummy variables are included to capture constant di¤erences in
labor and marriage markets across geographical areas in the US. As our analysis concerns
several PSID waves, year dummy variables are also used, along with clustering at the head
of household level. All our regression analysis is run with bootstrapped standard errors using
1,000 replications based on the number of clusters in household head id (see Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009).
5 Matching patterns: a preliminary look
In what follows, we consider two di¤erent samples. One consists of the total subpopulation of
households satisfying the criteria indicated above, a total of 4,251 observations (approximately
1,750 couples). We shall further restrict our analysis to recently married couples (i.e., couples
married for three years of less). From a theoretical perspective, this sample is particularly
adequate for studying matching patterns. The price to pay is a serious reduction in the size
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of the sample, which shrinks to 881 observations (approximately 690 couples).
The main characteristics of the data are described in Table 1. Interestingly, with the
exception of age, the main statistics are fairly similar across samples. In each case, the
average number of years of schooling slightly exceeds 14, with the recently married couples
being little more educated, and the wives being on average more educated than their husbands.
Regarding weight, a salient feature is that male BMI is on average much larger than female;
the average man is actually overweight (BMI above 25), whereas female average BMI remains
inferior to 23 in both samples. When obese spouses are included, the average BMI is 27.63 for
husbands and 24.91 for wives. The prevalence of obesity among the husbands is 23%, while
for wives it is 15%. These results are in line with those of Kano (2008), Averett et al. (2008)
and Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2010). These estimates contrast with those of Ogden et
al. (2006), who, using data from the NHANES, estimated that the US rate of adult obesity
prevalence is 31.1% for males and 33.2% for females in 2003-04. As Kano (2008) pointed out,
this di¤erence might stem from the fact that we focus on married couples, not on the general
US population.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Regarding the correlation of individual characteristics within couples, Table 2 summarizes
some clear patterns. We rst note, as expected, a signicant level of assortative matching on
economic characteristics. In all samples, the wifes education is strongly correlated with both
the husbands education ( > :55) and log wage ( > :2); these correlations are statistically
highly signicant, and consistent with previous studies (e.g., Lam, 1988; Wong, 2003). A
second conclusion is the existence of a signicant negative correlation between education
and BMI. The correlation is stronger for women than for men; perhaps more surprising
is the fact that, for women, the correlation is the strongest for recently married couples,
whereas for husbands the correlation is smaller (in absolute terms) in the recently married
sample. An interesting remark, however, is that the correlation between male wage and BMI is
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actually always positive, and statistically signicant in both the total and the recently married
samples. Finally, since her education is both positively correlated with his wage but negatively
correlated with her BMI, one might expect a negative relationship between his wage and her
BMI; Table 2 indeed conrms this prediction in all samples, the correlation ranging between
-.09 and -.11 depending on the sample. However, the converse does not hold. Although
wealthier husbands tend both to be fatter and to have thinner wives, male and female BMIs
are actually positively correlated on the sample. This results, which is consistent with previous
studies in the medical (e.g., Allison et al., 1996; Speakman et al., 2007) and economic (e.g.,
Hitsch et al., 2010; Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque, 2010) literatures, suggests that, as argued
in introduction, physical appearance is another element of the assortative matching pattern.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To further explore the relationship between the two aspects - i.e., physical and socioeco-
nomic attractiveness - Tables 3 to 6 split the two samples in two according to each of the
various criteria (female education, male wage, male and female BMI). Specically:
 regarding male wage, the threshold is median log wage; we therefore consider the two
subpopulations located respectively below and above the median log wage.
 for female education, we distinguish between women with high school education or less
(corresponding to a number of years smaller than or equal to 12) and women with at
least some college (13 years and above).
 nally, regarding BMI we follow the literature by distinguishing between "normal" and
"overweight" individuals - the threshold being at the value of 25. As discussed above,
this results in asymmetries between genders; specically, two third of males, but only
one fourth of females are overweight.
[Insert Tables 3-6 about here]
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A rst conclusion is that assortative matching indeed takes place along the two dimensions.
Starting with the recently married sample, we see (Tables 3 and 4) that high wage husband
do have more educated wives, and educated wives have higher wage husbands, in both the
normal and the overweight population. This pattern is actually present in the two samples; it
simply conrms the assortative matching on socioeconomic characteristics that we mentioned
above (and that has been abundantly described in the literature).
Regarding weight, things are a little bit more complex. Recently married wives of over-
weight husbands tend to have a higher BMI in both the low- and high- wage subsamples;
symmetrically, the husbands of overweight wives tend to have a higher BMI in both the low-
and high- education subsamples. Note, however, that the di¤erence is not statistically signif-
icant, possibly due to the small size of the sample. If we consider the total sample (Tables
5 and 6), the positive BMI correlation is maintained and actually becomes statistically sig-
nicant, but only among the high wage or high education subpopulations; when the wife
education does not exceed high-school, the average weight of the husband is actually lower
for overweight wives, although the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.
A particularly interesting insight is provided by the interaction between these character-
istics. Considering, again, the recently married sample (Tables 3 and 4), we see that wives of
normal weight husbands are more educated than those of overweight husbands, even within
each wage class, and that wives of low-wage husbands tend to have a higher BMI than those
of high-wage husbands whether the husband is overweight or not. By the same token, the
husbands wage is higher when the wife is normal-weight than when she is overweight, for both
high and low female education households. None of these e¤ects is statistically signicant at
the 5% level, a fact that again may reect the small size of the sample. If we consider the total
sample instead (Tables 5 and 6), we see that again overweight husbands have less educated
wives, the di¤erence being now highly signicant for the high wage couples (but not for the
low wage ones); and that wives of low wage husbands are signicantly heavier than those of
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high wage ones, irrespective of the husbands BMI. Similarly, average husband wage is higher
when the wife is not overweight, the di¤erence being (highly) signicant for educated women
only. Finally, among women who are not overweight, low-educated ones have fatter husbands,
the di¤erence being highly signicant, although the nding does not extend to (the minority
of) overweight women.
All in all, these tables are consistent with the basic story presented above. Assortative
matching takes place along the two dimensions of physical and socioeconomic attractiveness;
moreover, a trade-o¤ seems to exist, whereby a lower level of physical attractiveness can be
compensated by better socioeconomic characteristics and conversely. However, while these
ndings are globally supportive of our theory, they do not constitute clean tests of it. Devel-
oping such tests is the topic of the next section.
6 Formal test and estimation
6.1 A linear specication
In order to formally implement the model, we rst need to further specify its form. We start


























We have concluded above that the distribution of any female characteristic conditional on the
husbands prole
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In other words: if, on the sample of married couples, we regress the various male characteristics
over the characteristics of the wife, the coe¢ cients we obtain should be proportional across
the various regressions.









where the random term kj captures the impact of the unobserved heterogeneity, as well as
other shocks a¤ecting the process; note that we must allow the kj to be correlated across k.
The theory then predicts that there exists some 1; :::; K such that:
kn = k fn for all (k; n) (5)









for all (k; s; n;m) (6)
Hence, we can estimate (4) simultaneously for all characteristics k using Seemingly-
Unrelated-Regression (SUR), and test for (6); alternatively, we can estimate (4) simulta-
neously for all characteristics k with the restriction (5). If the estimations do not lead to
statistically di¤erent results, then we obtain the marginal rate of substitution between char-





Note that, in this linear specication of the indices, the MRSm;ni does not vary across char-
acteristics k. Finally, the same strategy can be used for female characteristics.
6.2 Main Results
We start with the sample of recently married couples. Table 7 presents the regression of
wifes on husbands characteristics. As expected, the wifes BMI is negatively related to
the husbands wage and positively to his BMI, while her education exhibits the opposite
patterns. This nding is consistent with the view that wage positively contributes to a mans
attractiveness, while excess weight has a negative impact. The proportionality test (6) is not
rejected (p-value above .35). Table 8 exhibit identical features for a womans attractiveness,
with a very signicant correlation of the spouses BMIs, but now a non-signicant impact of
her education on his BMI, and thus a non-signicant ratio (the proportionality test is not
rejected with p-value above .30). As discussed above, while the population of recently married
couples closely ts our theoretical framework, its small size may be a problem.
[Insert Tables 7-8 about here]
To overcome the sample size issue, we run the same regressions on the total sample; results
are reported in Tables 9 and 10. The results are quite encouraging. First, the sign patterns
are exactly as before; moreover, all coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% level. Second, the
point estimates are in the same ballpark as with the restricted sample, suggesting that the
patterns at stake are structural and do not change much over marital duration. Thirdly, the
proportionality tests still fail to reject (p-values are larger than .14). All in all, these results
support our basic assumption.
[Insert Tables 9-10 about here]
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Numerically, the point estimates suggest, for the ratio of the coe¢ cient of husbands log
wage to his BMI, a value around -8.5 (or -0.3 if BMI is substituted with its logarithm); in
other words, a 10% increase in BMI can be compensated by a 3% increase in husbands
wage. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that this marginal rate of substitution for
men translates into a price per kilo of about 4$ per work week, for a man of an average
height earning an average wage who works 40 hours a week. Similarly, the ratio between the
wifes education and BMI coe¢ cients is between 2 and 4; i.e., an additional year of education
compensates about 3 BMI units - more or less the di¤erence between the average female BMI
in the population and one unit above the threshold for being overweight.
We also perform constrained estimations corresponding to the regressions presented above.
Tables 11 and 12 present the estimated trade-o¤s between characteristics for the full sample,
which are consistent with the previous unconstrained estimates.
[Insert Tables 11-12 about here]
7 Extensions
7.1 Nonlinearities
An obvious weakness of the linear specication adopted so far is that it assumes the MRSs
are constant - i.e., that the trade-o¤s between physical and socioeconomic attractiveness are
the same for all agents. We now relax this assumption in di¤erent ways. First, we break
down the samples by family income, and we perform the same regressions as above on the
two subpopulations (below and above the median) thus obtained. The results support the
intuition mentioned above. Among low income families, the wifes education is positively
related to her husbands wage and negatively to his BMI (both coe¢ cients are signicant at
the 1% level); the wifes BMI is also signicantly and negatively related to the husbands
log wage and positively related to his BMI. Among wealthier households, the sign pattern
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is identical. The interesting nding, however, is that the order of magnitudes across these
two subpopulations is similar. The same patterns emerge when considering the regressions of
husbands characteristics on the wifes; and we do not nd di¤erences in the ratio of coe¢ cients
across these two subpopulations. These results suggest that, in a somewhat counterintuitive
way, the MRSs between physical and socioeconomic characteristics are quite similar across
various income classes.
[Insert Tables 13-14 about here]
An alternative and somewhat more structural test consists in enriching the form adopted
for the respective indices by introducing an interaction between phsysical and socioeconomic
criteria, thus allowing the weight of the physical component of attractiveness to vary with
the socioeconomic level. Table 15 conrms the previous conclusions by showing no evidence
of interaction e¤ects: the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms are not statistically signicant.
In Table 16, a similar pattern arises for the husbands log wage regression.
[Insert Tables 15-16 about here]
Finally, we have explored other possible deviations from linearity. We have checked for
non-monotonicities by adding quartile dummy variables for education, wage and BMI. We did
not nd any evidence of non-monotonicities. Alternatively, we have run the same regressions
using squared terms in education, wage and BMI; again, we did not nd evidence of non-
linearities.
7.2 Height
Another possible indicator of physical attractiveness is height. However, whether the height
criterion is valued in a unanimous way (all men prefer taller women) or in an individual-
specic one (say, tall men prefer tall women, but short males prefers petites) is not clear;
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moreover, the existing literature tends to suggest that height is a measure of male, rather
than female, physical attractiveness.
In Tables 17 and 18, we include this anthropometric dimension as an additional charac-
teristic that men and women may value in the marriage market. Several ndings emerge
from these estimates. First, accounting for height does not a¤ect our main results. We still
cannot reject the proportionality of the ratios between wage (education) and BMI. Second,
the only robust relationship regarding height is the correlation between spouses heights; how-
ever, height does not signicantly correlate with the other indicators (with the exception of
husbands weights, which is correlated with the wifes education but not her BMI).
[Insert Tables 17-18 about here]
One possible interpretation of these results is that height does not a¤ect the attractiveness
index we study. This does not mean that height is irrelevant for the matching process, but
simply that it matters, if at all, only as an additional variable (the "s and s in our baseline
formulation (1)). This interpretation, in turn, suggests a natural test: since the subindices
I and J should be weakly separable, we should nd that the MRSs between BMI and wage
(or education) are the same irrespective of height. In order to test this prediction, we run
the previous regressions independently, on subsamples consisting respectively of shorter and
taller individuals. The results, as reported in Tables 19-20, are clear: the weak separability
property is unambigously not rejected, and the ratios are actually similar in the di¤erent
subpopulations.
[Insert Tables 19-20 about here]
7.3 Obese couples
Our analysis has focused on couples in the normal-overweight range (18.5BMI<30). One
concern with this population may be the endogeneity of BMI. However, for obese couples,
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one may think of BMI as being out of their control, given that there are genetic factors that
determine obesity status and complex biochemical systems that tend to maintain body weight
(Rosenbaum, Leibel and Hirsch, 1997; Comuzzie and Allison, 1998; Woods, Seeley, Porte and
Schwarts, 1998). Hence, if we run the regression for obese couples and we nd the same
substitutability between BMI and wage (or education) as in the sample of normal-overweight
couples, then we can argue that the potential endogeneity of BMI over the range normal and
overweight is not driving our empirical results. Further, if looking at the sample of obese
couples we found the same substitutability as in the sample of normal-overweight couples,
this would support our linear framework. Interestingly, Tables 21 and 22 show the similar
compensation patterns for obese couples4.
[Insert Tables 21-22 about here]
7.4 Additional issues
Finally, we proceed to a few robustness checks. First, the presentation given above is asym-
metric across genders, since the socioeconomic indicator is wage for men and education for
women. To see whether this asymmetry may a¤ect our results, we run the regressions using
the education of the husband (instead of his wage) to proxy for socioeconomic attractiveness.
The qualitative results are similar, although the proportionality of the ratios is now rejected
(see Tables 23 and 24).
[Insert Tables 23-24 about here]
Secondly, our main results (signs, magnitudes and proportionality) are robust to the inclu-
sion of health status and number of children. This supports the idea that BMI is capturing
physical attractiveness rather than health aspects. In the same vein, we have considered
alternative BMI ranges such as 20-30 and 17-30, obtaining similar results.
4Considering obese and non-obese couples together yields the same qualitative results.
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8 Conclusions
Our paper relies on a few, simple ideas. One is that the nature of the matching process taking
place on marriage markets is multidimensional, and involves both physical and socioeconomic
ingredients. Secondly, we explore the claim that this matching process may admit a one-
dimensional representation. In other words, the various characteristics only matter through
some one-dimensional index. We present a formal framework in which this assumption can be
taken to data. Under a weak separability assumption, we show that our framework generates
testable predictions. Moreover, should these predictions be satised, then the indices are
identied in the ordinal sense (i.e., up to an increasing transform); in particular, the marginal
rates of substitution between characteristics, which summarize the trade-o¤s between the
various elements involved, can be recovered. Finally, using data from the PSID, we nd that
our predictions are not rejected. An estimation of the trade-o¤s suggests that among men, a
10% increase in BMI can be compensated by a higher wage, the supplement being estimated
to be around 3%. Similarly, for women, an additional year of education may compensate
up to three BMI units. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that this marginal rate of
substitution for men translates into a price per kilo of about 4$ per work week, for a man of
an average height earning an average wage who works 40 hours a week.
Our approach clearly relies on specic and strong assumptions. One dimensionality is a
serious restriction, if only because it assumes that a womans attractiveness involves the same
arguments with identical weighting for all men (and conversely). Still, it can be seen as a
rst and parsimounious step in a promising direction - i.e., including several dimensions in
the empirical analysis of matching. Although we are interested here in marriage markets,
other applications (to labor markets in particular) could also be considered. Perhaps the
main contribution of this paper is to show that models of this type, once correctly specied,
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables, PSID 1999−2007. 
 














Weighted Mean 37.65 39.78 22.91 25.72 14.13 14.15 3.03 
SD 8.20 8.81 2.78 2.39 2.02 2.09 0.63 
Min 20 19 18.51 18.55 9 9 1.20 
Max 50 69 29.95 29.99 17 17 4.99 
Observations 4,251 
 
4,251 4,251 4,251 4,251 4,136 4,251 
B. Duration of 















Weighted Mean 29.60 31.46 22.68 25.51 14.34 14.12 2.79 
SD 6.71 7.50 2.61 2.50 2.00 2.05 0.58 
Min 20 19 18.56 18.56 9 9 1.20 
Max 50 69 29.95 29.99 17 17 4.99 
Observations 881 881 881 881 881 852 881 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). Wife’s age is in 


















 Table 2: Correlation Matrix. Coefficient of correlation (p-value) 










Wife’s BMI 1.000 
 
    
Husband’s BMI 0.0633 
(0.0000) 
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Wife’s BMI 1.000 
 
    
Husband’s BMI 0.0572 
(0.0895) 
1.000    
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Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). Wife’s 













 Table 3: Mean Wife’s Education and BMI by Husband’s Weight-Wage pair. Duration of 
marriage ≤ 3 years. 
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F-Test:  

















































Joint Equality of Rows and 
Columns 
F-Test:  







Means are computed using family weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the household head id are reported 
in parentheses and p-value of the F-tests in brackets.  
Overweight husband takes value 1 if BMI is 25 or above, 0 otherwise. 
High-Wage husband takes value 1 if log wage is above the median (in the full sample), 0 otherwise. 
The F-tests are performed after estimating the following model:  
Wife’s Education (BMI) = α + βOverweight + γHigh-Wage + δ(Overweight×High-Wage) 
The F-tests for the equality of rows are Ho: α = α + β and Ho: α + γ = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for 
the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + β and α + γ = α + β + γ + δ. The F-tests for the equality of columns are 
Ho: α = α + γ and Ho: α + β = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + 




 Table 4: Mean Husband’s Log Wage and BMI by Wife’s Weight-Education pair. 
Duration of marriage ≤ 3 years. 
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Joint Equality of Rows and 
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F-Test:  














































Joint Equality of Rows and 
Columns 
F-Test:  







Means are computed using family weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the household head id are reported 
in parentheses and p-values of the F-tests in brackets.  
Overweight wife takes value 1 if BMI is 25 or above, 0 otherwise. 
High-Educated wife takes value 1 if education is 13 and above, 0 otherwise. 
The F-tests are performed after estimating the following model:  
Husband’s Log Wage (BMI) = α + βOverweight + γHigh-Educated + δ(Overweight×High-Educated) 
The F-tests for the equality of rows are Ho: α = α + β and Ho: α + γ = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for 
the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + β and α + γ = α + β + γ + δ. The F-tests for the equality of columns are 
Ho: α = α + γ and Ho: α + β = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + 




 Table 5: Mean Wife’s Education and BMI by Husband’s Weight-Wage pair. Full sample. 
 












































Joint Equality of Rows and 
Columns 
F-Test:  

















































Joint Equality of Rows and 
Columns 
F-Test:  







Means are computed using family weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the household head id are reported 
in parentheses and p-values of the F-tests in brackets.  
Overweight husband takes value 1 if BMI is 25 or above, 0 otherwise. 
High-Wage husband takes value 1 if log wage is above the median, 0 otherwise. 
The F-tests are performed after estimating the following model:  
Wife’s Education (BMI) = α + βOverweight + γHigh-Wage + δ(Overweight×High-Wage) 
The F-tests for the equality of rows are Ho: α = α + β and Ho: α + γ = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for 
the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + β and α + γ = α + β + γ + δ. The F-tests for the equality of columns are 
Ho: α = α + γ and Ho: α + β = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + 




 Table 6: Mean Husband’s Log Wage and BMI by Wife’s Weight-Education pair. Full 
sample 
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Joint Equality of Rows and 
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F-Test:  














































Joint Equality of Rows and 
Columns 
F-Test:  







Means are computed using family weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the household head id are reported 
in parentheses and p-value of the F-tests in brackets.  
Overweight wife takes value 1 if BMI is 25 or above, 0 otherwise. 
High-Educated wife takes value 1 if education is 13 and above, 0 otherwise. 
The F-tests are performed after estimating the following model:  
Husband’s Log Wage (BMI) = α + βOverweight + γHigh-Educated + δ(Overweight×High-Educated) 
The F-tests for the equality of rows are Ho: α = α + β and Ho: α + γ = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for 
the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + β and α + γ = α + β + γ + δ. The F-tests for the equality of columns are 
Ho: α = α + γ and Ho: α + β = α + β + γ + δ, respectively. The F-test for the joint equality of rows is Ho: α = α + 




 Table 7: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics. 
Duration of marriage ≤ 3 years. 
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.10 0.17 
Sample size 881 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.87 
(p-value = 0.3515) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
687 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 8: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics. 
Duration of marriage ≤ 3 years. 
 Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.13 0.23 
Sample size 881 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 1.04 
(p-value = 0.3080) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
687 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 9: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics.  
Full sample. 
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.05 0.14 
Sample size 4,251 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 1.86 
(p-value = 0.1726) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
1,749 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 10: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics.  
Full sample. 
 Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.04 0.20 
Sample size 4,251 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 2.17 
(p-value = 0.1411) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
1,749 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 11: Constrained SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s 
Characteristics. Full sample. 
 
Wife’s BMI = {a1} + {k}×{b2}×Husband’s Log Wage + {b2}×Husband’s BMI + {d1}×Wife’s Age 
Wife’s Education = {a2} + {k}×{c2}×Husband’s Log Wage + {c2}×Husband’s BMI + {d2}×Wife’s Age  
 
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 

















{d2} -- −0.016*** 
(0.006) 
 
R2 0.02 0.09 
Sample size 4,251 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Feasible generalized non-linear least squares regression 
estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 1,749 clusters in 
household head id) are reported in parentheses.                        












 Table 12: Constrained SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s 
Characteristics. Full sample. 
 
Husband’s BMI = {a1} + {k}×{b2}×Wife’s Education + {b2}×Wife’s BMI + {d1}×Husband’s Age 
Husband’s Log Wage = {a2} + {k}×{c2}×Wife’s Education + {c2}×Wife’s BMI + {d2}×Husband’s Age 
  
 Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 

















{d2} -- 0.018*** 
(0.001) 
 
R2 0.02 0.14 
Sample size 4,251 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Feasible generalized non-linear least squares regression 
estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 1,749 clusters in 
household head id) are reported in parentheses.                        












 Table 13: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics. 
Full sample broken down by Family Income (below and above the median). 
   
I. Low Family Income Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.07 0.10 
Sample size 2,126 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.09 
(p-value = 0.7639) 
   
II. High Family Income Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.08 0.11 
Sample size 2,125 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.95 
(p-value = 0.3298) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
1,099 (low income) and 1,030 (high income) clusters in household head id) are reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.                                 




 Table 14: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics. 
Full sample broken down by Family Income (below and above the median). 
   
I. Low Family Income Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.06 0.09 
Sample size 2,126 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.15 
(p-value = 0.6979) 
   
II. High Family Income Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.06 0.10 
Sample size 2,125 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.85 
(p-value = 0.3552) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
1,099 (low income) and 1,030 (high income) clusters in household head id) are reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.                                 




 Table 15: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics 
with interaction term. Full sample. 
 
Wife’s BMI = {A1} + {B1}×Husband’s Log Wage + {B2}×Husband’s BMI + {B3}×Husband’s BMI 
×Husband’s Log Wage +  {D1}×Wife’s Age 
 
Wife’s Education = {A2} + {C1}×Husband’s Log Wage + {C2}×Husband’s BMI + {C3}×Husband’s BMI 
×Husband’s Log Wage +  {D2}×Wife’s Age 
  
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 



























{C3} -- −0.018 
(0.026) 
 
{D2} -- −0.016*** 
(0.006) 
R2 0.02 0.09 
Sample size 4,251 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Feasible generalized non-linear least squares regression 
estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 1,749 clusters in 
household head id) are reported in parentheses.                                 






 Table 16: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics 
with interaction term. Full sample. 
 
Husband’s BMI = {A1} + {B1}×Wife’s Education + {B2}×Wife’s BMI + {B3}×Wife’s BMI ×Wife’s 
Education +  {D1}×Husband’s Age 
 
Husband’s Log Wage = {A2} + {C1}×Wife’s Education + {C2}×Wife’s BMI + {C3}×Wife’s BMI ×Wife’s 
Education +  {D2}×Husband’s Age 
 
 
 Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 



























{C3} -- 0.001 
(0.002) 
 
{D2} -- 0.018*** 
(0.001) 
R2 0.02 0.14 
Sample size 4,251 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Feasible generalized non-linear least squares regression 
estimates. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 1,749 clusters in 
household head id) are reported in parentheses.                                 






 Table 17: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics 
adding height. Full sample.  
 
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Height Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on    




























R2 0.05 0.08 0.15 
Sample size 4,251 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients    









Test ratio column (1) = column (2) Chi2(1) = 2.57 
(p-value = 0.1090) 
Test ratio column (1) = column (3) Chi2(1) = 1.81 
(p-value = 0.1787) 
Test ratio column (2) = column (3) Chi2(1) = 6.67 
(p-value = 0.0098) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based 
on 1,749 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include 
state and year fixed effects.                                 










 Table 18: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics 






Husband’s        
Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on    




























R2 0.04 0.08 0.21 
Sample size 4,251 










Test ratio column (1) = column (2) Chi2(1) = 0.05 
(p-value = 0.8316) 
Test ratio column (1) = column (3) Chi2(1) = 2.20 
(p-value = 0.1376) 
Test ratio column (2) = column (3) Chi2(1) = 0.05 
(p-value = 0.8191) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based 
on 1,749 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include 
state and year fixed effects.                                 









 Table 19: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics. 
Full sample broken down by Husband’s Height (below and above the median). 
   
I. Short Husbands Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.09 0.16 
Sample size 1,810 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.05 
(p-value = 0.8289) 
   
II. Tall Husbands Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.07 0.18 
Sample size 2,441 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 1.60 
(p-value = 0.2056) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
809 (short husbands) and 1,070 (tall husbands) clusters in household head id) are reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.                                 




 Table 20: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics. 
Full sample broken down by Wife’s Height (below and above the median). 
   
I. Short Wives Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.06 0.22 
Sample size 1,798 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 2.72 
(p-value = 0.0992) 
   
II. Tall Wives Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.07 0.22 
Sample size 2,453 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.47 
(p-value = 0.4953) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
801 (short wives) and 1,084 (tall wives) clusters in household head id) are reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.                                 




 Table 21: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics. 
Obese couples. 
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.20 0.23 
Sample size 525 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.36 
(p-value = 0.5469) 
Note: We consider obese couples, BMI ≥30. Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
263 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 22: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics. 
Obese couples. 
 Husband’s BMI Husband’s Log Wage 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.23 0.33 
Sample size 525 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 0.27 
(p-value = 0.6026) 
Note: We consider obese couples, BMI ≥30. Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
263 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 23: SUR Regressions of Wife’s Characteristics on Husband’s Characteristics. 
Full sample. Husband’s Education instead of Husband’s Log Wage. 
 Wife’s BMI Wife’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.07 0.35 
Sample size 4,136 
B. MRS = ratio of coefficients   






Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 3.11 
(p-value = 0.0779) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
1,707 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 














 Table 24: SUR Regressions of Husband’s Characteristics on Wife’s Characteristics. 
Full sample. Husband’s Education instead of Husband’s Log Wage. 
 Husband’s BMI Husband’s Education 
A. Index’s coefficients on   















R2 0.04 0.37 
Sample size 4,136 







Equality of ratios test Chi2(1) = 7.87 
(p-value = 0.0050) 
Note: We consider individuals who are in the normal-overweight range, BMI [18.5, 30). 
Wife’s age is in the range [20, 50]. Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications based on 
1,707 clusters in household head id) are reported in parentheses. All regressions include state 
and year fixed effects.                                 
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
